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Abstract
■ We assessed electrophysiological activity over the medial
frontal cortex (MFC) during outcome-based behavioral adjust-
ment using a probabilistic reversal learning task. During record-
ing, participants were presented two abstract visual patterns on
each trial and had to select the stimulus rewarded on 80% of
trials and to avoid the stimulus rewarded on 20% of trials. These
contingencies were reversed frequently during the experiment.
Previous EEG work has revealed feedback-locked electrophys-
iological responses over the MFC (feedback-related negativ-
ity; FRN), which correlate with the negative prediction error
[Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. The neural basis of human error
processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-
related negativity. Psychological Review, 109, 679–709, 2002]
and which predict outcome-based adjustment of decision values
[Cohen, M. X., & Ranganath, C. Reinforcement learning signals
predict future decisions. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 371–378,
2007]. Unlike previous paradigms, our paradigm enabled us to
disentangle, on the one hand, mechanisms related to the re-
ward prediction error, derived from reinforcement learning
(RL) modeling, and on the other hand, mechanisms related to
explicit rule-based adjustment of actual behavior. Our results
demonstrate greater FRN amplitudes with greater RL model-
derived prediction errors. Conversely expected negative out-
comes that preceded rule-based behavioral reversal were not
accompanied by an FRN. This pattern contrasted remarkably
with that of the P3 amplitude, which was significantly greater
for expected negative outcomes that preceded rule-based be-
havioral reversal than for unexpected negative outcomes that
did not precede behavioral reversal. These data suggest that
the FRN reflects prediction error and associated RL-based adjust-
ment of decision values, whereas the P3 reflects adjustment of
behavior on the basis of explicit rules. ■
INTRODUCTION
The medial frontal cortex (MFC) has been implicated in
the flexible adjustment of behavior on the basis of changes
in reward and punishment values (Cohen & Ranganath,
2007; Rushworth, Buckley, Behrens,Walton,&Bannerman,
2007; Roelofs, van Turennout, & Coles, 2006; Ridderinkhof,
Ullsperger, Crone, &Nieuwenhuis, 2004). However, debate
continues over its precise contribution. Here we focus on
one of its electrophysiological signatures, the feedback-
related negativity (FRN), to further elucidate the role of
the MFC (Holroyd & Coles, 2008; Gehring & Willoughby,
2002, but seeNieuwenhuis, Slagter, vonGeusau,Heslenfeld,
& Holroyd, 2005; van Veen, Holroyd, Cohen, Stenger, &
Carter, 2004) in distinct formsof outcome-based adjustment.
It has long been accepted that behavior can be adjusted
by one or more of multiple decision systems (Daw, Niv, &
Dayan, 2005). For example, behavioral adjustment might
be controlled by incremental “caching”-like reinforcement
learning (RL), associated most commonly with the (dorso-
lateral) striatum, or by more explicit rules, associated most
commonly with the pFC. Here we aim to assess the de-
gree to which the FRN, measured over the MFC, reflects
outcome-induced adjustment of decisions on the basis of
the reward prediction error, derived from a standard RL
model, or alternatively outcome-based adjustment of deci-
sions on the basis of an explicit rule, given to participants
during task instruction.
This question relates to the ongoing debate about the
function of the MFC (Botvinick, 2007; Rushworth et al.,
2007; Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995). In particular, it
speaks to current hypotheses that theMFC signals the need
to adjust performance (Roelofs et al., 2006; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).
Specifically, the present study aims to extend recent find-
ings by Cohen and Ranganath (2007), who reported a
relationship between FRN amplitude and behavioral ad-
justment during a probabilistic decision making task. Criti-
cally, in this task, there was no explicit rule, and participants
were required to select between two options on the screen,
each of which was rewarded with a 50% probability. The
authors observed greater FRN amplitude after reward
omission than after reward. In addition, FRN amplitude
(accompanying feedback on trial n) was larger when the
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subject switched their response on the subsequent trial
(n + 1) to the other option (i.e., not the option they had
selected on trial n) compared with when they did not
switch. The authors presented a prediction error learning
model that accounted for their FRN data. This model reg-
istered a larger prediction error accompanying feedback
before a response switch than before a response repeat,
controlling for feedback valence. The present study aims
to extend these findings by assessing FRN amplitudes dur-
ing unexpected reward omissions that do not lead to actual
behavioral adjustment with those during expected reward
omissions that do lead to behavioral adjustment.
To this end, weused a paradigm that has been commonly
used to study outcome-based behavioral adjustment, that
is, the probabilistic reversal learning task (Cools, Clark,
Owen, & Robbins, 2002; Swainson et al., 2000). After hav-
ing obtained a learning criterion, the contingencies re-
verse and participants adjust their behavior accordingly.
In our version of the task, we instructed participants to
reverse responding to the previously punished but newly
rewarded stimulus only when they were sure that the con-
tingencies had changed. This explicit rule enabled us to
separately assess, on the one hand, mechanisms related
to the reward prediction error and, on the other hand,
mechanisms related to explicit rule-based adjustment of
actual behavior. Indeed as instructed, after contingency
reversal, participants continued to choose the previously
rewarded stimulus until they had acquired sufficient and
unambiguous evidence for the need to adjust respond-
ing. Accordingly, the negative prediction error was larg-
est during a first reward omission but then reduced with
successive reward omissions, until, just before reversal,
the subject was no longer surprised, hence reversed re-
sponding on the next trial. Thus, if the FRN reflects nega-
tive prediction error (and associated RL-based adjustment
of decision values), then its amplitude should diminish as
reward omissions become better predicted. Indeed, its
amplitude should be smallest just before actual behav-
ioral reversal. However, if the FRN reflects explicit rule-
based behavioral adjustment, then its amplitude should
be largest (more negative) during the reward omission
just before behavioral reversal. Consistent with previous
theorizing and empirical data (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007;
Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003; Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002), we anticipated that
the FRN amplitude would correlate positively with the re-
ward prediction error and not with rule-based behavioral
adjustment.
To test this hypothesis, we assessed the relationship be-
tween the FRN amplitude and (both the positive and the
negative) the reward prediction error, derived from a stan-
dard RL model, not only across different trial types (as has
been done previously; Holroyd et al., 2003, Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2002) but also by examining trial-by-trial variation
in FRN amplitude. Specifically, we used linear regression
analysis, with the FRN amplitude as the dependent mea-
sure and the model-derived prediction error as the inde-
pendent measure, to test whether the FRN scales with
increasing magnitude of prediction error (as reflected in
the slope of the regression line).
METHODS
Participants
Thirteen healthy, right-handed students from the Univer-
sity of Cambridge (5 men, age 19–22 years) were recruited.
Exclusion criteria were recent head injury, psychiatric or
neurological disease, use of psychiatric drugs, and color
blindness. Participants received a small fee for participation
and provided informed consent approved by the Univer-
sity of Cambridge Research Ethics Committee.
Experimental Design
The study used a probabilistic reversal learning paradigm,
adapted from Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, and Robbins
(2007) and Cools et al. (2002), administered on a desktop
computer. Responses were recorded using a button box.
On each trial, two Hiragana characters were presented on
either side of a central fixation point. Participants were in-
structed to select one of the characters and received feed-
back on their choice in the form of either a green smiling
face (reward) or a red frowning face (punishment). One of
the stimuli (the correct stimulus) would result in reward
on 80% of trials, whereas the other (the incorrect stimu-
lus) would be rewarded on 20% of trials. Intermittently,
the contingencies reversed, after between 4 and 10 choices
of the highly rewarded stimulus. After contingency rever-
sal, selection of the previously correct stimulus would lead
to punishment on every trial until the subject selected the
now-correct stimulus. Each block contained four rever-
sals. Participants completed 10 blocks, preceded by a short
practice session. Participants were presented with the fol-
lowing task instructions.
You will see two pictures. One of the pictures is
correct and the other is wrong. You have to choose the
correct pattern on each go. On some goes, the computer
will tell you that you were wrong even if you chose the
correct pattern. Your task is to stick to the pattern that is
usually correct. Sometimes the rule may change so that
the other pattern is now usually correct. You then have
to follow this new rule and choose the new pattern so
that, in general, you still get as many green smiley faces
as possible over the whole of the task. It is important
that you only start choosing the other pattern when you
are sure that the rule has changed!!! The rulewill change
several times, but there is no way of predicting when it
will change. The same two patterns will be presented
throughout the task. Try to respond as quickly as you
can. If you respond too slowly, then the computer will
tell you that you were “too late.” Try to avoid this as
much as possible. Fixate on the cross in between trials.
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Stimuli remained on the screen until the subject made
a response on the button box, then, after a 1000-msec de-
lay, feedback was presented for 500 msec. The feedback/
subsequent stimuli delay was jittered between 750 and
1250 msec to ensure that feedback-related activity was
not confounded by presentation of the next stimulus.
Electrophysiological Recording and ERP Extraction
Scalp electrical activity was recorded with a 128-electrode
HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Net (Tucker, 1993). Each elec-
trode was adjusted until its impedance was below 50 kΩ.
Data were recorded at 250 Hz, using the vertex electrode
(129th electrode) as the reference. The amplifier band-pass
was 0.1–100 Hz, and the data were low-pass filtered at 40 Hz
off-line. The data were average referenced and corrected
for the polar average reference effect ( Junghofer, Elbert,
Tucker, & Braun, 1999). Epochs of 700 msec (200 msec
baseline before feedback presentation, 500 msec after)
were extracted. Epochs were excluded if they had am-
plitudes greater than 70 μV or a channel variance of 0, as
these were likely to contain eye blinks or other artifacts.
Channels for which 15% or more of segments contained
artifacts were marked as bad, and their data were excluded.
In epochs where fewer than 15% channels were marked
bad, data from bad channels were interpolated from the re-
maining channels. Notably only one channel of one epoch
for one subject was marked bad on the basis of the elec-
trodes included in the ROIs.
Feedback-locked ERPs were extracted from five trial
types to investigate our a priori hypotheses:
1. “valid positive” (vP) feedback coinciding with correct
responses (excluding the first correct response after be-
havioral switching);
2. “spurious negative” (sN) feedback coinciding with
correct responses;
3. negative feedback coincidingwith erroneous responses
after contingency reversal, which were not followed by be-
havioral switching (“preceding negative”; pN);
4. negative feedback coinciding with the final erroneous
response before behavioral switching (“final negative”;
fN); and
5. positive feedback coinciding with the first correct re-
sponse after behavioral switching (“first positive”; fP).
The data from the epochs were averaged across each
condition to produce an average waveform for each trial
type and each subject. These waveforms were then base-
line corrected by subtracting the mean of the first (pre-
stimulus) 200 msec from the rest of the epoch.
Feedback-related Negativity
The amplitude of the FRN for each subject was deter-
mined by subtracting the average of the preceding and
following positive peaks (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) from
the lowest point within a window 248–296 msec post-
feedback (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005), using data
from a symmetrical cluster of eight central electrodes (6,
7, 13, 31, 55, 80, 106, and 112; see Figure 1, top marked
cluster). If the lowest point was at the edge of the win-
dow, the size of the window was widened until the lowest
point was then no longer on the edge of the window in
order that the nadir of the FRN be identified correctly.
The equivalent was performed for the preceding and fol-
lowing peaks (if the highest point was at the edge of the
window, the window was increased in size) to ensure that
the zeniths were identified. The window for the preced-
ing peak was between 180 and 208 msec postfeedback,
and the window for the following peak was between 346
and 376 msec postfeedback.
P3
Inspection of the data revealed large P3 responses during
selective trial types. We decided to also quantify the P3
amplitude for the following two reasons. First, the mea-
surement of the FRN can be affected by the P3 amplitude.
Second, evidence indicates that the P3 can be elicited by
detection of changes in task contingency (Barcelo, Escera,
Corral, & Perianez, 2006; Johnson & Donchin, 1982) as
well as by unpredicted (rewarding) events (Bellebaum &
Daum, 2008; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007;
Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Hajcak, Moser,
Yeung, & Simons, 2005). Our paradigm provides a unique
opportunity to disentangle the role of the P3 in the de-
tection of unexpected events, contingency changes, and
actual behavioral adaptation. Hence, we used a method
similar to that used by Yeung and Sanfey (2004) to obtain
independent estimates of FRN and P3 amplitude and ap-
plied the trial-by-trial linear regression method to the P3
as well as the FRN. Critically, we performed supplementary
analyses to disentangle the estimates of these two ERPs
(see Supplementary ERP analyses section).
P3 amplitude was quantified by extracting data from the
central as well as a parieto-occipital region (a symmetrical
cluster of eight posterior electrodes: 61, 62, 67, 71, 72, 76,
77, and 78; see Figure 1, bottom marked cluster). Because
the data in the time range of the P3 component included
some noise such that a clear P3 peak was not easy to
determine, a measure of mean amplitude over a 300- to
500-msec postfeedback window was used. Of the sensors
used, five specific locations correspond closely to locations
within the 10–10 system, that is, 6 (FCz), 55 (CpZ), 67
(PO3), 72 (POz), and 77 (PO4) (Luu & Ferree, 2000).
Reinforcement Learning Model
To further investigate our predictions, specifically those in-
spired byHolroyd and Coles (2002), the RL (Q value)model
used by Cohen and Ranganath (2007) was implemented.
938 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 4
The Q value of the selected stimulus A is updated with
new information using the following algorithm:
QAðt þ 1Þ ¼ QAðtÞ þ αδ
where δ is the prediction error (outcome(t)− QA(t)), α is
the learning rate, t is current trial, and outcome is 1 or−1
depending on feedback valence. Note that the discount-
ing parameter present in Cohen and Ranganathʼs model
was omitted because of a concern that the parameter
would reflect the autocorrelation of correct responses as a
result of the contingencies used in the task and be greater
than 1 if freely estimated. It was therefore set equal to 1.
The relative Q values of stimulus A and B were used to
compute the probability of selecting one of the stimuli
using the following equation:
PAðtÞ ¼ expðQAðtÞÞ=ðexpðQAðtÞÞ þ expðQBðtÞÞÞ
Individual learning rate parameters (i.e., α) were deter-
mined for each subject by optimizing the fit of the model,
that is, by maximizing the modelʼs estimation of the prob-
ability of selecting the outcome that the subject picks on
each trial using the nonlinear, unconstrained Nelder–Mead
simplex method implemented in Matlab 6.5 (MathWorks,
Natick, MA). The optimization algorithmwas run from differ-
ent starting points to ensure that the presence of local min-
ima did not influence accurate estimation of the parameter.
Having determined learning rate parameters for each
subject, values representing the prediction error δ on
each trial could be determined. The relationship between
these values and the FRN and P3 amplitude for each trial
were determined separately for each subject. First, all
trials were independently baseline corrected. The ampli-
tude of the FRN was determined for each trial using a sim-
ilar base/peak method to that described earlier, except
that the same latency for the FRN dip, preceding peak,
and following peak was used for each trial for a given sub-
ject. The latencies at the dip and peaks were estimated by
averaging all trials for each subject and then finding the
smallest voltage in the 248- to 296-msec window and the
preceding and following peak voltages. FRN amplitude
for each trial was then determined by subtracting the av-
erage of the voltages at the peaks from the voltage at the
dip. P3 amplitude on every trial was estimated by finding
the mean amplitude in the 300- to 500-msec postfeedback
window from the parietal electrodes. Using these values,
a linear model could then be fitted for each subject:
ERP Amplitude ¼ kδ þ intercept þ noise
Slopes (k) and intercepts were determined using FRN
and P3 amplitudes as the dependent measures. We then
determined whether the value of the slope was different
overall from 0 for the group for each dependent measure
using a one-sample t test. A significant difference from 0
would suggest a relationship between the size of the predic-
tion error and the size of the ERP amplitude on individual
trials. Separate analyses for positive and negative pre-
diction errors were performed given current controversy
Figure 1. Diagram showing
the distribution of scalp
electrodes (anterior electrodes
are at the top). Electrodes 6, 7,
13, 31, 55, 80, 106, and 112
were used to acquire central
electrical activity (for FRN
extraction—black outline, top
cluster), whereas electrodes 61,
62, 67, 71, 72, 76, 77, and 78
were used to acquire parietal
electrical activity (for P3
extraction—black outline,
bottom cluster).
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regarding the valence-specificity of the FRN. Although the
FRN is commonly thought to accompany outcomes that
are worse than expected, recent evidence indicates that it
might also have a larger (more negative) amplitude when
the outcome is better than expected (Oliveira, McDonald,
& Goodman, 2007). If the FRN scales with both types of
prediction error, then we would see significant linear rela-
tionships (as evidenced by regression slopes that are signif-
icantly greater than zero) between FRN and both negative
and positive prediction errors. Accordingly, we performed
two linear regression analyses, separately considering trials
on which prediction error was negative (the outcome was
worse than expected) and trials on which the prediction
error was positive (outcome better than expected). We
then compared the slopes and intercepts of these relation-
ships. If the FRN scales with the magnitude of the negative
prediction error (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), then the slope of
this relationship should be positive (more negative predic-
tion errors with more negative FRN). If it also scales with
the magnitude of the positive prediction error, then the
slope of the relationship between the positive prediction
error and the FRN should be negative (more positive pre-
diction errors with more negative FRN). In addition, if the
prediction error (negative or positive) is the critical deter-
minant of the FRN amplitude, then the intercepts of the
two regression equations should be similar. Alternatively,
if the FRN amplitude does not scale with increasing nega-
tive prediction error but simply reflects a binary evaluation
of whether the feedback was positive or negative, then
there should be a difference between the intercepts of
the two regression equations, but not their slopes (which
should be close to zero).
Behavioral and ERP Data Analysis
Parameters of interest for each subject were as follows
(see previous paragraphs): mean number of valid positive
(vP) trials, spurious negative (sN) trials, preceding nega-
tive (pN) trials, final negative (fN) trials, and first positive
(fP) trials; mean number of perseverative errors (pN + fN
trials); and probability of switching following spurious neg-
ative (sN) trials. Analysis of the FRN and P3 amplitude was
performed using repeated measures ANOVA, contrasting
each of the five trial types. Paired two-tailed t tests were
used to further assess planned comparisons of primary in-
terest, as outlined in the Introduction. An alpha level of .05
was used in all statistical comparisons. The Greenhouse–




All participants completed 10 blocks, aside from one sub-
ject who completed 13 blocks and another who completed
7 blocks because of a computer error. Mean numbers of
trial types were as follows: 322.9 vP trials (SD = 48.0),
93.0 sN trials (SD = 15.0), 52.6 pN trials (SD = 17.0),
39.3 fN (SD= 5.8), and 39.3 fP trials (SD= 5.8). There were
a mean of 2.3 perseverative errors (pN and fN trials) per
reversal (SD = 0.3), whereas the mean probability of
switching cue after a spurious negative trial was 0.075
(SD = 0.05).
After artifact detection and removal, the mean numbers
of artifact-free epochs were as follows: 239.9 vP trials (SD=
88.6), 72.9 sN trials (SD = 22.4, range = 26–107), 41.8 pN
trials (SD= 20.3), 28.5 fN trials (SD= 10.5, range = 8–40),
and 27.6 fP trials (SD = 10.5).
ERP Analysis: FRN
FRN amplitude for each trial type, computed using a peak
to peak method, was analyzed using a repeated measures
ANOVA with the within-subject factor trial type (five lev-
els). There was a main effect of trial type, F(2.2, 26.8) =
10.7, p < .001. Paired t tests were used to investigate this
effect (Figure 2): As predicted, FRN amplitude was larg-
est on spurious negative trials, then preceding negative
trials, whereas FRN amplitude was indistinguishable be-
tween final negative trials, valid positive trials, and first pos-
itive trials. Temporal dynamics of the FRN are displayed in
Figure 3A.
Thus, the events on which negative feedback was least
expected, that is, the spurious negative (sN) trials and the
preceding negative (pN) trials evoked the largest FRN am-
plitudes. However, the event that led to behavioral switch-
ing (fN) was not accompanied by an FRN relative to positive
feedback (either vP or fP trials). Hence, the FRN amplitude
was large during unexpected punishment events that were
not followed by behavioral switching. Conversely, there
Figure 2. Mean FRN amplitude for each trial type: vP = valid
positive; sN = spurious negative; pN = preceding negative; fN = final
negative; fP = first positive (*p < .05; **p < .005).
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was no FRN on expected punishment events that were fol-
lowed by behavioral switching.
ERP Analysis: P3
Mean amplitudes were extracted for each trial type from
parietal electrodes in a window of 300–500 msec post-
feedback and inserted in a repeated measures ANOVA.
There was a main effect of trial type, F(2.2, 26.6) = 12.527,
p < .001. Subsequent paired t tests (Figure 4) showed
that the largest P3 was produced on final negative (fN) trials.
The P3 on these fN trials was significantly larger than that
on spurious negative (sN) trials, t(12) = 4.15, p = .001.
The P3 amplitude did not differ significantly between the
first positive (fP), spurious negative (sN), and preceding
negative (pN) trials but was larger on each of these negative
feedback trials than on the valid positive (vP) trials (although
the difference between fP and vPwasmarginally significant),
t(12) = 1.85, p = .09. Temporal dynamics of the P3 are
displayed in Figure 3B.
Thus, P3 amplitude was greater during the negative
feedback trials that directly preceded behavioral switching
than during the spurious and preceding negative trials.
This pattern contrasts with that seen for the FRN.
Supplementary ERP Analyses
One might argue that the difference between the FRN am-
plitude on sN trials and that on fN trials is confounded by
the difference in the P3 amplitude between these trials,
which casts doubt on the validity of the contrast. However,
we performed a secondary analysis to demonstrate that
the same pattern of FRNs was obtained when we matched
a subset of sN and fN trials for parietal P3 amplitude. We
identified pairs of fN and sN trials whose absolute differ-
ence in P3 amplitude (recorded from parietal electrodes)
was as small as possible. If two or more fN trials were close
to a single sN trial, the fN/sN match with the smallest
absolute difference was included, and the fN trial with a
worse match was excluded. Amplitudes recorded from
central electrodes were compared from this subset of tri-
als (mean number of trials per participant = 22.3, range =
6–33). The maximal difference between those trial types
was most clearly evident in the time window in which
the FRN is expected (see Figure 5). Mean amplitude of
the selected sN and fN trails was approximately matched
in the windows that had been used to define the peaks
that preceded and followed the dip, first peak—180 to
208 msec, t(12) = 1.8, p = .098, second peak—356 toFigure 3. (A) Waveform plots for each trial type at central electrodes,
averaged across all participants: vP = valid positive; sN = spurious
negative; pN = preceding negative; fN = final negative; fP = first
positive. The red markers represent the approximate locations of the
peaks and dip used to calculate the FRN (FRN = dip—average of
the peaks). (B) Waveform plots for each trial type at parietal electrodes,
averaged across all participants. Red marker denotes time window in
which the P3 amplitude was determined.
Figure 4. Mean P3 amplitude for each trial type: vP = valid positive;
sN = spurious negative; pN = preceding negative; fN = final negative;
fP = first positive (*p < .05; **p < .005).
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376 msec, t(12) = 1.4, p = .19, whereas mean amplitudes
were clearly different between the two trial types in the
window used to define the dip, 248 to 296 msec, t(12) =
4.0, p = .002. Central P3 amplitudes in the selected sub-
set were also matched, mean amplitude between 300 and
500 msec, t(12) = 1.7, p = .113. A similar pattern of data,
although with weaker effect sizes, was observed when fN
and pN trials were compared in the same way.
Reinforcement Learning Analysis
A simple RL model was fitted to subjectʼs behavioral per-
formance by adjusting the magnitude of the learning rate
parameter. The model gave a good approximation of par-
ticipantsʼ behavioral performance (pseudo-R2 = .39, SE=
0.01). Participants had a mean learning rate of 0.73 (SE =
0.01). Mean prediction error was determined for each
trial type, and there was a significant main effect of trial
type, F(4, 48) = 2278.9, which was due to highly signifi-
cant paired t tests for comparisons between all five trial
types with each other, t(12) > 7.3, p < .001 in all cases.
As predicted, spurious negative trials were accompanied
by the most negative prediction error, followed by pre-
ceding negative, then final negative then valid positive,
and then first positive trials (see Figure 6).
The relationship between the FRN amplitude and the
magnitude of the prediction error was determined on a
trial-by-trial basis. As predicted, there was a positive rela-
tionship between negative prediction errors and FRN am-
plitude in all but one of the participants: Greater negative
prediction errors were associated with larger (more nega-
tive) FRN (Figures 7 and 8). The mean slope for the group
was significantly greater than 0, t(12) = 3.5, p = .004.
There was also a trend toward a significant negative re-
lationship between the positive prediction error and the
FRN amplitude (greater positive prediction errors result-
ing in a larger—more negative—FRN; Figure 7), although
the fitted slope was only marginally significantly different
from 0, t(12) = −2.0, p = .07. Paired t tests showed that
the slopes of the relationship between the prediction
error and the FRN differed significantly between positive
and negative prediction errors, t(12) = 4.6, p = .001, and
there was no significant difference between the absolute
slopes, t(12) = 1.6; p= .14. Together, these observations
suggest that both negative and positive prediction error
scaled linearly with FRN amplitude, although we note
that the relationship with the positive prediction error
should be treated with caution for several reasons (see
Discussion).
There was no significant difference in terms of the es-
timated intercepts, t(12) < 1 (Figure 9). Therefore, this
analysis further strengthened the hypothesis that FRN
amplitude is sensitive to the magnitude of prediction error
Figure 5. Graph describing the supplementary analysis of fN (blue
line) and sN (magenta line) trials using the P3 matching procedure.
The difference wave (black line) clearly demonstrates that the maximal
difference between the two waveforms is in the time window in which
the FRN is expected; hence, the statistical differences between the
conditions are not caused by confounding with P3 magnitude.
Figure 6. Reinforcement learning model-derived prediction error
associated with each trial type: vP = valid positive; sN = spurious
negative; pN= preceding negative; fN = final negative; fP = first positive.
Figure 7. Mean slope for relationships between negative prediction
error (gray) or positive prediction error (black) and maximum P3
amplitude (P3) and FRN amplitude (FRN), respectively.
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rather than simply its valence. Finally, the P3 amplitude
was fitted to positive and negative prediction errors sepa-
rately: Fitted slopes were not significantly different from 0
in any of the two models, negative, t(12) = 1.0, p= .3, and
positive, t(12) < 1, neither were the intercepts signifi-
cantly different between the two models, t(12) < 1.
Summary
Consistent with previous theorizing and empirical data,
the FRN amplitude in our study correlated positively with
negative prediction error. Specifically, the slope of the
relationship between the FRN amplitude and the negative
prediction error was significantly different from 0. By con-
trast, no evidence was found supporting the hypothesis
that the FRN amplitude reflects explicit rule-based behav-
ioral adjustment. Instead, the P3 amplitude was a better
predictor of rule-based behavioral adjustment because it
was largest on the negative feedback trials directly preced-
ing behavioral switching.
DISCUSSION
Adequate behavioral adjustment during probabilistic re-
versal learning not only depends on RL but might also
implicate explicit higher order knowledge. In the task
Figure 8. Figure showing the
relationship between the FRN
amplitude and the prediction
error in two representative
participants (Participants 4
[top] and 5 [bottom]). Note the
positive gradient between
prediction error and FRN
amplitude for negative
prediction errors. Prediction
error values are clustered
because of a combination of a
high learning rate and the
relatively stereotyped feedback
sequence combinations due to
the 80%/20% contingencies.
Figure 9. Mean intercept for relationships negative prediction error
(gray) or positive prediction error (black) and maximum P3 amplitude
(P3) and FRN amplitude (FRN).
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used here, participants were given such explicit higher or-
der knowledge, that is, the rule to switch responding only
when they were sure that the contingencies had changed.
This explicit rule enabled us to separately assess, on the
one hand, mechanisms related to RL and reward predic-
tion error, which likely contributed to adjustments of co-
vert decision values, and on the other hand, mechanisms
related to perhaps more explicit rule-based adjustment of
actual overt behavior. Previous data have shown that the
FRN predicts overt behavioral adjustment, when such ad-
justment is accompanied by a large reward prediction
error (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007). Conversely, our finding
indicates that outcome-based behavioral adjustment is ac-
companied by a P3 rather than an FRN, when such behav-
ioral adjustment is instead triggered by an explicit rule.
Thus, increases in the FRN with behavioral adjustment
are seen only if it is triggered by a large prediction error
rather than by an explicit rule. Indeed in the study by
Cohen and Ranganath (2007), reward probability was
50%, and the adoption of explicit rules or strategies was
discouraged. Together these data indicate that different
forms of outcome-based behavioral adjustment have dis-
tinct electrophysiological signatures, corresponding to
the FRN and the P3, respectively.
These data speak to the wider literature in which the
observation that distinct neural systems contribute to differ-
ent forms of behavioral control is receiving an increasing
amount of attention (Dayan, 2007; Frank & Claus, 2006;
Daw et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), with one system
implicated primarily in incremental and integrative RL and
another in more flexible and faster “tree-based search”
adjustments. The finding that the FRN correlates with the
reward prediction error rather than with rule-based ad-
justment also concurs more generally with the conclusion
that the MFC might play an important role in the adjust-
ment of decision values based on the integration of events
across reinforcement history ( Jocham, Neumann, Klein,
Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2008;
Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007). The find-
ing that, by contrast, the P3 was largest just before (and just
after) rule-based behavioral adjustment concurs with pre-
vious data supporting a relationship between the P3 am-
plitude and the detection and (cued) implementation of
changes in task contingencies (Fleming, Mars, Gladwin, &
Haggard, 2009; Barcelo et al., 2006; Donchin & Coles, 1988;
Johnson & Donchin, 1982). However, there was no clear
evidence for an association between P3 amplitude and pre-
diction error or valence (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Hajcak
et al., 2007; Hajcak, Holroyd, et al., 2005; Hajcak, Moser,
et al., 2005). Likewise, accounts of P3 amplitude (Duncan-
Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Squires, Wickens, Squires, &
Donchin, 1976), which focus on the unpredictability of
the sequence of different types of event (in this case, posi-
tive or negative feedback), would not easily capture this
pattern of data because, in general, the longer the sequence
of a particular type of trial, the smaller the P3 amplitude.
The probabilistic reversal learning task is somewhat un-
usual in that the longer the sequence of negative feedback,
the greater the likelihood of a change in task contingency:
In many tasks, it is the surprising trial itself that can be seen
to signal a change in the local stimulus probability (Mars
et al., 2008). One possible explanation for the apparent
discrepancy with previous data is that, unlike in previous
studies, the most unexpected outcome in our task is not
necessarily also the most behaviorally relevant or salient.
Thus, the P3might reflect an aspect of behavioral relevance
not dependent on the violation of a stimulus-outcome ex-
pectancy and one which is likely to involve the updating of
stimulus-response associations. In the present paradigm,
this is better coupled to the detection of a change in the
rule rather than a change in the associative strength of
the stimulus itself (which is reflected by the FRN).
There are a number of open questions regarding the
neural systems that mediate these distinct electrophysio-
logical correlates of probabilistic reversal learning. In par-
ticular, studies with lesion patients (e.g., Barcelo & Knight,
2007) may elucidate the necessary contribution of the re-
gions activated during the distinct trial types (as revealed
by previous fMRI work with the paradigm; Cools et al.,
2002) both to FRN and P3 generation and to behavior.
Candidate regions include not only the MFC and the pari-
etal cortex but also the ventral striatum and the ventrolat-
eral PFC (Cools et al., 2002).
Likewise, questions regarding the influence of neuro-
modulators on these processes require further study. For
example, according to the model of Holroyd and Coles
(2002), dopamine might be critically implicated in the gen-
eration of the FRN. Specifically, a phasic reduction in the
firing of dopamine neurons could disinhibit layer V neu-
rons in the MFC, allowing these cells to become synchro-
nously depolarized. Our finding that the FRN amplitude
tended to correlate positively, albeit only marginally with
the positive prediction error, provides a challenge to this
view. Indeed unexpected positive events are generally
accepted to be accompanied by bursts rather than dips
in the firing of dopamine neurons (Hollerman & Schultz,
1998; but see Brischoux, Chakraborty, Brierley, & Ungless,
2009; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). By contrast, our data
are compatible with other reports showing that the FRN
amplitude is greater when outcome expectations are vio-
lated, regardless of the expected valence of the outcome
(Oliveira et al., 2007). Nonetheless, caution is warranted
when interpreting this finding for three reasons. First, the
correlation did not quite reach statistical significance. Sec-
ond, our Q-learning model is not optimized for capturing
the dynamics of any positive prediction error in our higher
order reversal task (Hampton, Bossaerts, & OʼDoherty,
2006). For example, participants are unlikely to be surprised
when they receive reward after a contingency reversal, yet
this fP trial is coded as being accompanied by a high positive
prediction error (Figure 6). Third, most importantly, it
should be noted that our base/peak method of evaluating
the FRN is biased against detection of positivities observed
within the 248- to 296-msec window as we determined the
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lowest point within this window. Hence, the magnitude of
any positive deflection within this period would have been
poorly estimated by our measurement of the base ampli-
tude. Future studies should further elucidate the valence-
specificity of the FRN.
There is evidence that dopaminergic and serotoninergic
manipulations influence human probabilistic reversal learn-
ing, in terms of both behavioral performance (Chamberlain
et al., 2006; Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001;Mehta,
Swainson, Ogilvie, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001) and neural
correlates (Cools et al., 2007; Evers et al., 2005). Specifically,
the dopamine-enhancing drugs L-dopa and methylpheni-
date were recently observed to modulate BOLD activity
in the ventral striatum during final reversal errors but not
during spurious negative feedback in this task (Dodds
et al., 2008; Cools et al., 2007). Conversely, serotoninergic
manipulation by the dietary tryptophan depletion proce-
dure modulated activity in the MFC, and this effect was
not restricted to the final reversal errors but extended to
the spurious negative feedback events (Cools, Roberts, &
Robbins, 2008; Evers et al., 2005). Future study should ad-
dress the obvious next question, that is, whether the switch-
specific P3 and the unexpected feedback-related FRN are
differentially modulated by dopaminergic and serotoniner-
gic manipulations, respectively. In addition, noradrenergic
mechanisms might also influence the amplitude of the P3
(Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005) and FRN (Riba,
Rodriguez-Fornells, Morte, Munte, & Barbanoj, 2005).
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